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Title:Labor market pooling, outsourcing and labor contracts PDF Logo
Authors:Picard, Pierre M.
Wildasin, David E.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2765
Abstract:Economic regions, such as urban agglomerations, face external demand and price shocks that produce income risk. Workers in large and diversified agglomerations may benefit from reduced wage volatility, while firms may outsource the production of intermediate goods and realize benefits from Chamberlinian externalities. Firms may also protect workers from wage risks through fixed wage contracts. This paper explores the relationships between firms' risks, workers' contracts, and the structure of production in cities.
Subjects:labor market
labor contracts
Chamberlinian externalities
JEL:R12
R23
J31
J65
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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