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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Dragu, Tiberiu | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Polborn, Mattias | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-01-04 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:20:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:20:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30493 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | How does electoral accountability affect the effectiveness of terrorism prevention in a democ- racy? We analyze the connection between electoral accountability and policy effectiveness in the context of terrorism prevention. We develop a formal model of an interaction between a government, a minority community, and a representative voter. All actors share the objective of terrorism prevention and have symmetric information. We show that electoral pressures to be successful in terrorism prevention create a commitment problem for the government and this can lead to less security. If the representative voter cares more about terrorism prevention, the government intensifies anti-terrorism activities that are under its direct control, but cooperation by the minority community weakens, and, as a result, security may decrease. We also show that commitment to ex-post suboptimal anti-terrorism activity is desirable for the government, but such commitment is difficult to achieve without explicit institutional constraints such as an effective judicial review on government's antiterrorism actions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2864 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | terrorism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | elections | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | accountability | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Terrorism prevention and electoral accountability | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 615599575 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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