|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30477
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Aharonovitz, Gilad D. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Skuza, Nathan | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Fahs, Faysal | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-09-02 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T08:20:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T08:20:04Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30477 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Institutions are important for proper economic performance, but are replaceable by trust or other social norms. We show that when proper institutions and trust are missing, integrity of the individuals can replace them. We construct a model of a transactions-based economy with contracts preceding the transactions, and show that any one of (1) institutions, (2) trust, or (3) integrity, foster economic growth. We construct data of economic performance of social groups in Lebanon, measure integrity and other values of these groups, and use this data and data from Kenya to support one of the model's predictions. Policy implications are discussed. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper 2730 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | A13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E19 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Z10 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | economic development | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | institutions | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | integrity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Lebanon | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | social norms | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | trust | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entwicklung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Institutionalismus | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Vertrauen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziale Norm | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Glaubwürdigkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Libanon | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kenia | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Can integrity replace institutions? : theory and evidence | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 60800832X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|