Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/30475 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 2647
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees.
Subjects: 
altruism
conditional
cooperation
self-selection
JEL: 
D11
D12
D64
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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