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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30473
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| Title: | | Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices  |
| Authors: | | Kessing, Sebastian G. |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2789 |
| Abstract: | | Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions. |
| Subjects: | | accountability federalism decentralization retrospective voting Condorcet Jury Theorem |
| JEL: | | H73 D72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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