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Title:Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices PDF Logo
Authors:Kessing, Sebastian G.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2789
Abstract:Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.
Subjects:accountability
federalism
decentralization
retrospective voting
Condorcet Jury Theorem
JEL:H73
D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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