EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30469
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorRosendahl, Knut Einaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:19:58Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:19:58Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30469-
dc.description.abstractTradable black (CO2) and green (renewables) quotas gain in popularity and stringency within climate policies of many OECD countries. The overlapping regulation through both instruments, however, may have important adverse economic implications. Based on stylized theoretical analysis and substantiated with numerical model simulations for the German electricity market, we show that a green quota imposed on top of a black quota does not only induce substantial excess cost but serves the dirtiest power technologies as compared to a black quota regime only.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2837en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen_US
dc.subject.keywordgreen quotasen_US
dc.subject.keywordoverlapping regulationen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwKohlendioxiden_US
dc.subject.stwGrüne Zertifikateen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKosten-Nutzen-Analyseen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleGreen serves the dirtiest : on the interaction between Black and Green Quotasen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612915972en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
612915972.pdf336.86 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.