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dc.contributor.authorFiva, Jon H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNatvik, Gisle Jamesen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:19:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:19:38Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30440-
dc.description.abstractWe identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2709en_US
dc.subject.jelE62en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.jelH72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic capital accumulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordidentifying popularity shocksen_US
dc.subject.stwInfrastrukturinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Investitionen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDo re-election probabilities influence public investment?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605748527en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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