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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30428
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| Title: | | Conflict, settlement, and the shadow of the future  |
| Authors: | | McBride, Michael Skaperdas, Stergios |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2897 |
| Abstract: | | In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely than settlement. We demonstrate the theoretical robustness of this finding, discuss its applicability in war, litigation, and other settings, and test it in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to engage in risky conflict as the future becomes more important. |
| Subjects: | | conflict litigation property rights folk theorem |
| JEL: | | C72 C91 D01 D74 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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