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dc.contributor.authorKarakosta, Ouraniaen_US
dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen_US
dc.contributor.authorLopez-Garcia, Miguel-Angelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:19:28Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:19:28Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30427-
dc.description.abstractThis paper identifies conditions under which, starting from any tax distorting equilibrium, destination- and origin-based indirect tax-harmonizing reforms are potentially Pareto improving in the presence of global public goods. The first condition (unrequited transfers between governments) requires that transfers are designed in such a way that the marginal valuations of the global public goods are equalized, whereas the second (conditional revenue changes) requires that the change in global tax revenues, as a consequence of tax harmonization, is consistent with the direction of inefficiency in global public good provision relative to the (modified) Samuelson rule. Under these conditions, tax harmonization results in redistributing the gains from a reduction in global deadweight loss and any changes in global tax revenues according to the Pareto principle. And this is the case independently of the tax principle in place (destination or origin).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2668en_US
dc.subject.jelF15en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelH87en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordorigin principleen_US
dc.subject.keyworddestination principleen_US
dc.subject.keywordindirect tax harmonizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordreform of commodity taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal/local public goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwIndirekte Steueren_US
dc.subject.stwVerbrauchsteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen_US
dc.subject.stwBestimmungslandprinzipen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDoes indirect tax harmonization deliver pareto improvements in the presence of global public goods?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603310052en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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