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Title:Government decentralization as a disincentive for transnational terror? : an empirical analysis PDF Logo
Authors:Dreher, Axel
Fischer, Justina A. V.
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper 2699
Abstract:Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Our results show that expenditure decentralization reduces the number of transnational terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact. These results are robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.
Subjects:terrorism
decentralization
federalism
governance quality
government effectiveness
JEL:D74
H70
H40
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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