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dc.contributor.authorAronsson, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorKoskela, Erkkien_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T08:18:13Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T08:18:13Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30416-
dc.description.abstractThis paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-country OLG economy, where each country is characterized by asymmetric information between the government and the private sector, and where one of the countries outsources part of its production to the other. In the country whose firms outsource production abroad, the government will respond to outsourcing by implementing a more progressive labor income tax structure and higher marginal capital income tax rates than it would have done in the absence of outsourcing. The tax policy response by the government in the country that receives foreign production capacity is, in general, ambiguous and depends on a tradeoff between wage-equality and factor income from abroad. By using the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we also consider tax policy cooperation leading to higher welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper 2776en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH25en_US
dc.subject.jelJ31en_US
dc.subject.jelJ62en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordoutsourcingen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal nonlinear taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordintertemporal modelen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen_US
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen_US
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal income taxation : outsourcing and policy cooperation in a dynamic economyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn61018069Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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