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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30412
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| Title: | | On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods  |
| Authors: | | Bierbrauer, Felix |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper 2663 |
| Abstract: | | The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a profit-maximizing firm. This also makes participation constraints desirable. |
| Subjects: | | public goods mechanism design incomplete contracts regulations |
| JEL: | | D82 H41 L51 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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