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dc.contributor.authorBannier, Christina E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorBehr, Patricken_US
dc.contributor.authorGüttler, Andréen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-10T12:54:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-10T12:54:46Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-2009110909en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30175-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Both self-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonable explanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996 and December 2006 show that rating conservatism may play a role for industrial firms, but self-selection cannot be fully rejected. Neither can it for insurance companies, though data restrictions impede further conclusions. For unsolicited bank ratings, however, we find strong evidence that rating conservatism is an important cause. The downward bias also appears to increase along with banks’ opaqueness.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFrankfurt School of Finance & Management Frankfurt, M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Frankfurt School of Finance & Management 133en_US
dc.subject.jelG15en_US
dc.subject.jelG24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUnsolicited Ratingsen_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordConservatismen_US
dc.subject.keywordOpaquenessen_US
dc.titleRating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn614142490en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:133-
Appears in Collections:Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

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