Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129
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dc.contributor.authorHefeker, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorNeugart, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:43:33Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30129-
dc.description.abstractWhen enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges have more discretion in common as opposed to civil law systems more reform activity as a response to crises should be observed in the former system. This finding is backed by evidence from a panel of OECD countries.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJoint discussion paper series in economics |x2009,15en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelK31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor market regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor courtsen_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten_US
dc.titleLabor market regulation and the legal systemen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603932819en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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