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dc.contributor.authorBriglauer, Wolfgangen_US
dc.contributor.authorGötz, Georgen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwarz, Antonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-12en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:43:32Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:43:32Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30127-
dc.description.abstractThis paper looks at the effects of different forms of wholesale and retail regulation on retail competition in fixed network telephony markets. We explicitly model two asymmetries between the incumbent operator and the entrant: (i) While the incumbent has zero marginal costs, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (positive) marginal costs; (ii) While the incumbent is setting a two-part tariff at the retail level (fixed fee and calls price), the entrant can only set a linear price for calls. Competition from other infrastructures such as mobile telephony or cable is modelled as an outside opportunity for consumers. We find that a horizontally differentiated entrant with market power may be subject to a margin squeeze due to double marginalization but will never be completely foreclosed. Entrants without market power might be subject to a margin squeeze if the wholesale access price is set at average costs and competitive pressure from other infrastructures increases. We argue that a wholesale price regulation at average costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss retail minus and deregulation as potential alternatives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 2008,27en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelL42en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelL96en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordaccess regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen_US
dc.subject.keywordmargin squeezeen_US
dc.subject.keywordtelecommunicationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfixed networksen_US
dc.titleMargin squeeze in fixed-network telephony markets: competitive or anticompetitive?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn606654097en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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