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Title:Margin squeeze in fixed-network telephony markets: competitive or anticompetitive? PDF Logo
Authors:Briglauer, Wolfgang
Götz, Georg
Schwarz, Anton
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Joint discussion paper series in economics 2008,27
Abstract:This paper looks at the effects of different forms of wholesale and retail regulation on retail competition in fixed network telephony markets. We explicitly model two asymmetries between the incumbent operator and the entrant: (i) While the incumbent has zero marginal costs, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (positive) marginal costs; (ii) While the incumbent is setting a two-part tariff at the retail level (fixed fee and calls price), the entrant can only set a linear price for calls. Competition from other infrastructures such as mobile telephony or cable is modelled as an outside opportunity for consumers. We find that a horizontally differentiated entrant with market power may be subject to a margin squeeze due to double marginalization but will never be completely foreclosed. Entrants without market power might be subject to a margin squeeze if the wholesale access price is set at average costs and competitive pressure from other infrastructures increases. We argue that a wholesale price regulation at average costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss retail minus and deregulation as potential alternatives.
Subjects:access regulation
foreclosure
margin squeeze
telecommunications
fixed networks
JEL:L12
L41
L42
L50
L96
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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