Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30102
Authors: 
Calahorrano, Lena
Lorz, Jens Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Joint discussion paper series in economics 2009,26
Abstract: 
In this note we analyze how aging affects immigration policy. We set up a dynamic political-economy model of representative democracy in which the government of the destination country sets the immigration level to maximize aggregate welfare of the constituency. Aging, i.e. a decline in the growth rate of the native population, has an expansionary effect on immigration. This immigration effect may even overcompensate the initial decline in population growth such that the total labor force grows more strongly and the capital stock per worker declines. We also compare our results to the social planner allocation and to the median-voter equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Demographic change
political economy
immigration policy
JEL: 
D78
F22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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