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MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg >
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|Title:||Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator |
|Authors:||van Aaken, Anne|
Feld, Lars P.
|Issue Date:||2008 |
|Series/Report no.:||Joint discussion paper series in economics 2008,01|
|Abstract:||It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly reduces corruption of officials.|
Judicial Independence and Positive Constitutional Economics
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg|
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