Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30094
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dc.contributor.authorAlbert, Maxen_US
dc.contributor.authorMertins, Vanessaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:40:28Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:40:28Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30094-
dc.description.abstractIt is often conjectured that participatory decision making may increase acceptance even of unfavorable decisions. The present paper tests this conjecture in a three-person power-to-take game. Two takers decide which fraction of the responder's endowment to transfer to themselves; the responder decides which part of the endowment to destroy. Thus, the responder can punish greedy takers, but only at a cost to herself. We modify the game by letting the responder participate in takers' transfer decision and consider the effect of participation on the destruction rate. We find that participation matters. Responders destroy more if they (1) had no opportunity to participate in the decision making process and (2) are confronted with highly unfavorable outcomes. This participation effect is highly significant for those responders (the majority) who show negative reciprocity (i.e., destroy more when takers are greedier).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics |cMarburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJoint discussion paper series in economics |x2008,05en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordparticipatory decision makingen_US
dc.subject.keywordpower-to-take gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordprocedural fairnessen_US
dc.titleParticipation and decision making: a three-person power-to-take experimenten_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn606253319en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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