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dc.contributor.authorBudzinski, Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-05T15:40:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-03-05T15:40:23Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/30086-
dc.description.abstractAdvanced economic instruments like simulation models are enjoying an increased popularity in practical antitrust. There is hope that they being quantitative predictive economic evidence can substitute for qualitative structural analysis and lead to unambiguous results. This paper demonstrates that it can be theoretically impossible to identify the most appropriate simulation model for any given merger proposal. Due to the inevitable necessity to reduce real-world complexity and multi-parameter character of merger cases, the comparative fit of proposed merger simulation models with mutually incompatible predictions can be the same. This is valid even if an ideal antitrust procedure is assumed. This insight is important regarding two aspects. First, the scope for partisan economic evidence cannot be completely eroded in merger control. Second, simulation cannot eliminate or substitute for qualitative reasoning and economically informed common sense.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJoint discussion paper series in economics 2008,03en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.jelC15en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelA11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmerger simulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmerger controlen_US
dc.subject.keywordantitrusten_US
dc.subject.keywordeconomic evidenceen_US
dc.titleA note on competing merger simulation models in antitrust cases: can the best be identified?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn606252940en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Universität Marburg

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