Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30025
Authors: 
Schlicht, Ekkehart
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 2010-6 [Pages:] 1-30 [DOI/URN:] doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-6
Abstract: 
Applicants for any given job are more or less suited to fill it, and the firm will select the best among them. Increasing the wage offer attracts more applicants and makes it possible to raise the hiring standard, thereby improving the productivity of the staff. Wages that optimize on the trade-off between the wage level and the productivity of the workforce are known as selection wages. As men react more strongly to wage differentials than females, the trade-off is more pronounced for men and a profit-maximizing firm will offer a higher wage for men than for women in equilibrium. The argument is not confined to issues of sex discrimination; rather it is of relevance for all labor markets where labor heterogeneity is important and supply elasticities vary systematically across occupations.
Subjects: 
Discrimination
sex discrimination
occupational discrimination
regional discrimination
selection wages
efficiency wages
hiring standards
monopsony
employment criteria
wage posting
Reder competition
wage structure
inter-industry wage structure
employer size-wage effect
occupational wage structure
JEL: 
J31
J7
B54
D13
D42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type: 
Article

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