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Title:Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-person Contest Games PDF Logo
Authors:Franke, Jörg
Kanzow, Christian
Leininger, Wolfgang
Väth, Alexandra
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Ruhr economic papers 130
Abstract:This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium endogenous with respect to the specific contest success function adopted by the contest designer. Hence, the aim of effort maximization implies the identification of those players who should be excluded from making positive efforts.We give a general proof for the existence of an optimal contest success function and provide an algorithm for the determination of the set of actively participating players.This is turn allows to determine optimal efforts in closed form.An important general feature of the solution is that maximization of total effort requires at least three players to be active.
Subjects:Effort maximization
existence of solution
asymmetric contests
participation constraints
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Ruhr Economic Papers, RWI
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des RWI

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