Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29901
Authors: 
Franke, Jörg
Öztürk, Tahir
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Ruhr economic papers 116
Abstract: 
Conflict parties are frequently involved into more than one conflict at a given time. In this paper the interrelated structure of conflictive relations is modeled as a conflict network where opponents are embedded in a local structure of bilateral conflicts. Conflict parties invest in specific conflict technology to attack their respective rivals and defend their own resources. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this conflict game and examine the relation between aggregated equilibrium investment (interpreted as conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. The derived results have implications for peaceful resolutions of conflicts because neglecting the fact that opponents are embedded into an interrelated conflict structure might have adverse consequences for conflict intensity.
Subjects: 
Network games
conflicts
conflict resolution
JEL: 
C72
D74
D85
ISBN: 
978-3-86788-129-6
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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