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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFrey, Bruno S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:27:56Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:27:56Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29871-
dc.description.abstractThe traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. It is often argued that reciprocity norms which establish a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shape tax morale to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland may be useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio- demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is analyzed. It can be concluded that Switzerland’s system of responsive regulation increases tax morale.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,26en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelH73en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax Evasionen_US
dc.subject.keywordTax Moraleen_US
dc.subject.keywordDeterrenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordResponsive Regulationen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuermoralen_US
dc.subject.stwDemokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwBürgerbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleIllegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax moraleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506452751en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Marburg Papers on Economics • Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Universität Marburg

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