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Title:Illegal, immoral, fattening or what?: How deterrence and responsive regulation shape tax morale PDF Logo
Authors:Feld, Lars P.
Frey, Bruno S.
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Marburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,26
Abstract:The traditional economic approach to tax evasion does not appear to be particularly successful in explaining the extent of tax compliance. It is often argued that reciprocity norms which establish a fiscal exchange between the state and the citizens shape tax morale to a large extent. In that respect, a case study of Switzerland may be useful because the small size of the cantons and their direct democratic political systems procedurally establish a close exchange relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities. In this paper, evidence is discussed on how tax morale in Switzerland evolved over time. In addition, the impact of economic, legal, socio- demographic, psychological and institutional factors on Swiss tax evasion is analyzed. It can be concluded that Switzerland’s system of responsive regulation increases tax morale.
Subjects:Tax Evasion
Tax Morale
Deterrence
Responsive Regulation
JEL:H26
H73
D73
D78
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Marburg Papers on Economics • Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Universität Marburg

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