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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:15:40Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:15:40Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29847-
dc.description.abstractRecent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of state interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,18en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordBudget Referendumsen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntergovernmental Grantsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInterest Group Influenceen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleVoters as a hard budget constraint: on the determination of intergovernmental grantsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506412989en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Marburg Papers on Economics • Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Universität Marburg

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