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dc.contributor.authorSchaltegger, Christoph A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-01-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-12T14:13:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-02-12T14:13:37Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29843-
dc.description.abstractThe fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different fiscal or constitutional institutions. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. Theoretically, they both describe the degree to which the costs of spending decisions are internalized by individual decision-makers. In addition, we evaluate whether constitutional rules for executive and legislation as well as budget rules shape the size of government and how the different rules interact with fragmentation in determining government size. The empirical study of the role of fragmented governments for fiscal policy outcomes is based on a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 period. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is negatively associated with fiscal discipline. Furthermore, the fiscal referendum does effectively restrict the fiscal commons problem, but less successfully than the budget rule.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,21en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.jelE63en_US
dc.subject.jelH61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFragmentationen_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal Policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordReferendumsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLegislative Rulesen_US
dc.subject.keywordBudget Rulesen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungskoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwStaatsquoteen_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltskonsolidierungen_US
dc.subject.stwRegelgebundene Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwReferendumen_US
dc.subject.stwSchweizen_US
dc.titleDo large cabinets favor large governments?: Evidence from Swiss sub-federal jurisdictionsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn506415252en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Marburg Papers on Economics • Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Universität Marburg

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