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dc.contributor.authorFeld, Lars P.en_US
dc.description.abstractStarting from the economic theory of federalism, this chapter surveys the development of EU revenue, spending and off-budget activities, discusses the redistributive impact of EU finances on member states, and budgetary decision-making procedures. The analysis is guided by a political economics perspective on the interaction between the different players in EU decision-making and the institutional restrictions they face. This involves the interests of the Commission, the Parliament as well as those of the single countries in the Council. They are restricted by the system of member states’ contributions to the EU and the balanced budget requirement, but also by the budgetary procedures that determine individual decision-making powers.en_US
dc.publisherUniv., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Marburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMarburger volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge 2004,11en_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Finanzwirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.titleEuropean public finances: much ado about nothing?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Marburg Papers on Economics • Marburger Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge, Universität Marburg

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