|
EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29759
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Baake, Pio | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wey, Christian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-09-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-02-04T13:06:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-02-04T13:06:10Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29759 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a high-demand and a low-demand market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria are distorted away from Cournot outcomes to prevent consumer arbitrage. Furthermore, a merger can lead to an equilibrium in which only the high-demand market is served. This is more likely (i) the lower consumers' transportation costs and (ii) the higher the concentration of the industry. Therefore, merger incentives are much larger than standard analysis suggests. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 919 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Imperfect market segmentation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | oligopoly | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | price discrimination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | consumer arbitrage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | mergers | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Übernahme | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Fusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomischer Anreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Oligopol | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Unvollkommener Markt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Marktsegmentierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preisdifferenzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wechselkosten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Transportkosten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Mergers in imperfectly segmented markets | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 608486175 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW DIW-Diskussionspapiere
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|