Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29739
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ensthaler, Ludwig | en |
dc.contributor.author | Giebe, Thomas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2009-05-11 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-02-04T13:05:56Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-02-04T13:05:56Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29739 | - |
dc.description.abstract | A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a buying mechanism which can be viewed as a game theoretic extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) |cBerlin | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDIW Discussion Papers |x880 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D21 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D43 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D44 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D45 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Auctions | en |
dc.subject.keyword | subsidies | en |
dc.subject.keyword | market design | en |
dc.subject.keyword | knapsack problem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Beschaffung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Auktionstheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ganzzahlige Optimierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Mechanism | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Forschungssubvention | en |
dc.subject.stw | Klein- und Mittelunternehmen | en |
dc.subject.stw | Monte-Carlo-Methode | en |
dc.subject.stw | Deutschland | en |
dc.title | Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig's greedy heuristic | - |
dc.type | |aWorking Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 599515619 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp880 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.