EconStor >
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin >
DIW-Diskussionspapiere >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29739
  
Title:Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig's greedy heuristic PDF Logo
Authors:Ensthaler, Ludwig
Giebe, Thomas
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Discussion papers // German Institute for Economic Research 880
Abstract:A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We propose a buying mechanism which can be viewed as a game theoretic extension of Dantzig's greedy heuristic for the classic knapsack problem. We use Monte Carlo simulations to analyse the performance of our mechanism. Finally, we discuss how the mechanism can be applied to award R&D subsidies.
Subjects:Auctions
subsidies
market design
knapsack problem
JEL:D21
D43
D44
D45
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des DIW
DIW-Diskussionspapiere

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
599515619.pdf129.3 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29739

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.