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dc.contributor.authorHerold, Katharinaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-28T14:21:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-28T14:21:59Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29692-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses and compares the efficiency of alternative incentive compatible grant schemes under asymmetric information relieving subnational governments of excessive debt burden. They allow intervention into local debt, local tax or complete local fiscal policy. In the first case, separation of types can be induced by forcing recipients to inefficient high borrowing and in the second case by imposing inefficient high tax rates. In the last case, fiscal policy of the recipient region is distorted in the period of the exogenous shock. We show that constraining complete financial autonomy leads to the lowest welfare losses. This is due to the fact that complete regulation of local fiscal policy reduces the incentive of contributing local governments to defect from truthful relevation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Finanzwiss. Forschungsinst. Kölnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesFiFo-CPE discussion papers 09-2en_US
dc.subject.jelH74en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvertical transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordsubnational debten_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric information adverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfinancial autonomyen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Schuldenen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwTeilstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwSelbstverwaltungen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleIntergovernmental grants and financial autonomy under asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617280932en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:uoccpe:092-
Appears in Collections:FiFo Discussion Papers, Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut, Universität Köln

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