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dc.contributor.authorClark, Derek J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSand, Jan Yngveen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-25T16:34:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-25T16:34:14Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.citationEconomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal 4 2010-1 1-48 doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1en_US
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29632-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordR&Den_US
dc.subject.keywordendogenous coalitionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric firmsen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen_US
dc.subject.stwForschungskooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwKoalitionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwForschungskostenen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwKonzentrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFlugzeugantrieben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleEndogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industriesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn616556527en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifweej:20101-
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