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Title:Endogenous technology sharing in R&D intensive industries PDF Logo
Authors:Clark, Derek J.
Sand, Jan Yngve
Issue Date:2010
Citation:[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 2010-1 [Pages:] 1-48 [DOI/URN:] doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1
Abstract:This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.
Subjects:R&D
endogenous coalitions
asymmetric firms
JEL:L11
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1
Creative Commons License:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type:Article
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Journal Articles

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