Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29632
Authors: 
Clark, Derek J.
Sand, Jan Yngve
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 4 [Issue:] 2010-1 [Pages:] 1-48 [DOI/URN:] doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2010-1
Abstract: 
This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either between the two most efficient firms, or a coalition with all three firms. The two-firm coalition is the preferred outcome of a welfare maximising authority if ex ante marginal cost is sufficiently high, and the threefirm coalition is preferred otherwise. Furthermore, we show that the equilibrium outcomes result in the lowest total R&D investment of all possible outcomes. Aircraft engine manufacturing provides a case study, and indicates the importance of antitrust issues as an addition to the theory.
Subjects: 
R&D
endogenous coalitions
asymmetric firms
JEL: 
L11
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type: 
Article

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