Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/29562
Authors: 
Herr, Annika
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
IWQW discussion paper series 08/2009
Abstract: 
Hospital markets are often characterised by price regulation and the existence of different ownership types. Using a Hotelling framework, this paper analyses the effect of different objectives of the hospitals on quality, profits, and overall welfare in a price regulated duopoly with symmetric locations. In contrast to other studies on mixed oligopolies, this paper shows that in a duopoly with regulated prices privatisation of the public hospital may increase overall welfare depending on the difference of the hospitals' marginal costs and the weight of the additional public hospital's motive.
Subjects: 
mixed oligopoly
price regulation
quality
hospital competition
JEL: 
L13
I18
H42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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