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dc.contributor.authorGrimm, Veronikaen_US
dc.contributor.authorZoettl, Gregoren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-13T14:02:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-01-13T14:02:00Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/29557-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze a market game where firms choose capacities under uncertainty about future market conditions and make output choices after uncertainty has unraveled. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium under imperfect competition and establish that capacity choices by strategic firms are generally too low from a welfare point of view. We also demonstrate that strategic firms choose even lower capacities if they anticipate competitive spot market pricing (e.g. due to regulatory intervention). We finally illustrate how the model can be used to assess the impact of electricity market liberalization on total capacity and welfare by fitting it to the data of the German electricity market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Inst. für Wirtschaftspolitik und Quantitative Wirtschaftsforschung Erlangenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIWQW discussion paper series 01/2008en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelD41en_US
dc.subject.jelD42en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestment incentivesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddemand uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcost uncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordCournot competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordFirst Besten_US
dc.subject.keywordSecond Besten_US
dc.subject.keywordcapacity obligationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordspot market regulationen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwKapazitätsplanungen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwMarktstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSpotmarkten_US
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStrategic capacity choice under uncertainty: the impact of market structure on investment and welfareen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn612408817en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:iwqwdp:012008-
Appears in Collections:IWQW Discussion Paper Series, FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg

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