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Title:Mechanisms for efficient voting with private information about preferences PDF Logo
Authors:Engelmann, Dirk
Grimm, Veronika
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:IWQW discussion paper series 03/2008
Abstract:We experimentally study behavior in a simple voting game where players have private information about their preferences. With random matching, subjects overwhelmingly follow the dominant strategy to exaggerate their preferences, which leads to inefficiency. We analyze an exogenous linking mechanism suggested by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) as well as repeated interaction in different settings, which could allow endogenous linking mechanisms to evolve. We find that applying the exogenous mechanism captures nearly all achievable efficiency gains, whereas repeated interaction leads to significant gains in truthful representation and efficiency only in a setting where players can choose their partners.
Subjects:Experimental Economics
Mechanism Design
Bayesian Equilibrium
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:IWQW Discussion Paper Series, FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg

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