Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/29539 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Working Paper No. 2009-10
Publisher: 
Kiel University, Department of Economics, Kiel
Abstract: 
We examine the bipartite graphs of German corporate boards in 1993, 1999 and 2005, and identify cores of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. Germany's corporate governance has experienced significant changes during this time, and there is substantial turnover in the identity of core members, yet we observe the persistent presence of a network core, which is even robust to changes in the tail distribution of multiple board memberships. Anecdotal evidence suggests that core persistence originates from the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized corporations.
Subjects: 
Network core
density
centrality
interlocking directorates
corporate governance
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.