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dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, Tiboren_US
dc.contributor.authorPerote, Javieren_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Ulrichen_US
dc.contributor.authorLoos, Malteen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-11T15:06:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-12-11T15:06:35Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.citation30 1 52-60 Journal of economic psychology 0167-4870en_US
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.04.005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28702-
dc.description.abstractIn the recent literature, several competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the stylized fact of declining contributions in repeated public goods experiments. We present results of an experiment that has been designed to evaluate these hypotheses. The experiment elicits individual beliefs about the contributions of the partners in the repeated game and involves between-subjects variation on information feedback. The data favor the hypothesis of selfish-biased conditional cooperation as the source for the declining contributions over the competing hypotheses.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformation feedbacken_US
dc.subject.keywordBelief formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary contributionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordConditional cooperationen_US
dc.titleSelfish-biased conditional cooperation: on the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experimentsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn599076887en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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