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Title:Selfish-biased conditional cooperation: on the decline of contributions in repeated public goods experiments
Authors:Neugebauer, Tibor
Perote, Javier
Schmidt, Ulrich
Loos, Malte
Issue Date:2009
Citation:[Volume:] 30 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 52-60 [Journal:] Journal of economic psychology [ISBN:] 0167-4870
Abstract:In the recent literature, several competing hypotheses have been advanced to explain the stylized fact of declining contributions in repeated public goods experiments. We present results of an experiment that has been designed to evaluate these hypotheses. The experiment elicits individual beliefs about the contributions of the partners in the repeated game and involves between-subjects variation on information feedback. The data favor the hypothesis of selfish-biased conditional cooperation as the source for the declining contributions over the competing hypotheses.
Subjects:Experimental economics
Information feedback
Belief formation
Public goods
Voluntary contributions
Conditional cooperation
JEL:C72
C92
H41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:doi:10.1016/j.joep.2008.04.005
Document Type:Article
Appears in Collections:Economists Online

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