Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28366
Authors: 
Langhammer, Rolf J.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel working paper 1533
Abstract: 
In the past, many WTO member states have liberalized their trade policies unilaterally. However, they were decreasingly prepared to guarantee these measures multilaterally, that is to bind them. This paper analyzes the background of this development by resorting to three political economy arguments pro multilateral binding: the terms of trade externality argument, the tying hand argument, that is to protect a government which is prone to liberalize against domestic lobby groups, and finally the argument that trade policies are instruments for general political targets. For all three arguments, it is shown why an important driving force of mercantilistically motivated trade negotiations has become weaker, the reciprocity requirement. The paper recommends narrower negotiation issues and mandates to prevent a further rising heterogeneity of issues and negotiation partners.
Subjects: 
International Trading Order
Multilateral Trading Negotiations
Reciprocity
JEL: 
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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