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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2822
  

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dc.contributor.authorDíaz-Vázquez, Pilaren_US
dc.contributor.authorSnower, Dennis J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:13:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:13:35Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2822-
dc.description.abstractDo firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbent employees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoretical literature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided that the newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. The reason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a countervailing fall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged. Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in the context of a stochastic model of the labour market, an increase in insider wages promotes firing in recessions, while leaving hiring in booms unchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCentre for Economic Policy Research London-
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCEPR Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London 3472-
dc.subject.jelE24-
dc.subject.jelJ31-
dc.subject.jelJ32-
dc.subject.jelJ64-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.stwLohnstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwInsider-Outsider-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stwAnspruchslohnen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCan insider power affect employment?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn354183117en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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