Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2822
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dc.contributor.authorDíaz-Vázquez, Pilaren_US
dc.contributor.authorSnower, Dennis J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:13:35Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:13:35Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/2822-
dc.description.abstractDo firms reduce employment when their insiders (established, incumbentemployees) claim higher wages? The conventional answer in the theoreticalliterature is that insider power has no influence on employment, provided thatthe newly hired employees (entrants) receive their reservation wages. Thereason given is that an increase in insider wages gives rise to a countervailingfall in reservation wages, leaving the present value of wage costs unchanged.Our analysis contradicts this conventional answer. We show that, in thecontext of a stochastic model of the labour market, an increase in insiderwages promotes firing in recessions, while leaving hiring in boomsunchanged. Thereby insider power reduces average employment.-
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCentre for Economic Policy Research |cLondon-
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCEPR Discussion Paper Series, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London |x3472-
dc.subject.jelE24-
dc.subject.jelJ31-
dc.subject.jelJ32-
dc.subject.jelJ64-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.stwLohnstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwInsider-Outsider-Modellen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsucheen_US
dc.subject.stwAnspruchslohnen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCan insider power affect employment?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.printppn354183117en_US

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