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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28190
  
Title:An empirical examination of repeated auctions for biodiversity conservation contracts PDF Logo
Authors:Groth, Markus
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:University of Lüneburg Working paper series in economics 78
Abstract:The European Union's Council Regulation on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development has introduced auctioning as a new instrument for granting agri-environmental payments and awarding conservation contracts for the recent multi-annual budgetary plan. This paper therefore deals with the conception and results of two case study auctions for conservation contracts. Results of two field experiments show much differentiated bid prices in the model-region and budgetary cost-effectiveness gains of up to 21% in the first auction and up to 36% in the repeated auction. Besides these promising results, some critical aspects as well as lessons to be learned will also be discussed in this paper to improve the design and performance of upcoming conservation auctions.
JEL:C93
D44
H41
Q24
Q28
Q57
R52
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series in Economics, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

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