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dc.contributor.authorDesgranges, Gabrielen_US
dc.contributor.authorHeinemann, Maiken_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-01T15:01:32Z-
dc.date.available2009-10-01T15:01:32Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28144-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes conditions for existence of a strongly rational expectations equilibrium (SREE) in models with private information, where the amount of private information is endogenously determined. It is shown that the conditions for existence of a SREE known from models with exogenously given private information do not change as long as it is impossible to use the information transmitted through market prices. In contrast, these conditions are too weak, when there is such learning from prices. It turns out that the properties of the function which describes the costs that are associated with the individual acquisition of information are important in this respect. In case of constant marginal costs, prices must be half as informative than private signals in order for a SREE to exist. An interpretation of this result that falls back on the famous Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox is also given.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherLeuphana-Univ. Lüneburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Lüneburg working paper series in economics 9en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEductive Learningen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrivate Informationen_US
dc.subject.keywordRational Expectationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrongly Rational Expectations Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwRationale Erwartungen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwGleichgewichten_US
dc.titleStrongly rational expectations equilibria with endogenous acquisition of informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn511787553en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series in Economics, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

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