EconStor >
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg >
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg >
Working Paper Series in Economics, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28129
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWein, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-08-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-01T15:01:20Z-
dc.date.available2009-10-01T15:01:20Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28129-
dc.description.abstractThe EU electricity directive (96/92/EC) established the right of the member states to choose between Regulated and Negotiated Third Party Access (RTPA and NTPA). The interest group theory is able to explain whether the introduction of NTPA in Germany had been an interest group equilibrium under the restriction of EU-directive. Using the NTPA associations of electricity power suppliers, network monopolists and industrial consumers negotiated three agreements. The last one (AA VVII+) in December 2001 introduced a market comparison scheme with three structural features: “East-/West-Germany”, “consumption/population density”, and “cable rate”. These features are variables which are supposed to reflect cost differences between network suppliers. The theoretical analysis will derive the hypothesis that this conception allows to introduce a cost irrelevant factor and therefore to increase prices without harming firms which do not hold this factor. This hypothesis could be tested by analyzing the German low and medium voltage network suppliers in 2002 and 2003. Our estimations show that the use of structural feature “East-/West Germany” and “consumption/population density” could be explained by this hypothesis. But because we have no firm specific information about cost differences other explanations could not be excluded: Monopoly prices differ with marginal costs, and regulation could reflect real cost differences. The third structural feature “cable rate” has no influence in low voltage networks, but has an impact on access charges levied in medium voltage networks. This relationship is only given if we use the borderlines given by AA VVII+. Hence, we are not able to reject the interest group theory: The feature “cable rate” was introduced successfully to increase access charges for medium network suppliers which have high cable rates without having higher costs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherLeuphana-Univ. Lüneburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUniversity of Lüneburg working paper series in economics 7en_US
dc.subject.jelD42en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL94en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordderegulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordnatural monopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEnergieverbunden_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleAssociations' agreement and the interest of the network suppliers: the strategic use of structural featuresen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn511728700en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Working Paper Series in Economics, Leuphana Universität Lüneburg

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
511728700.PDF292.12 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.