EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Journal Articles >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28105
  
Title:Minority voting and public project provision PDF Logo
Authors:Gersbach, Hans
Issue Date:2009
Citation:[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [Volume:] 3 [Issue:] 2009-35 [Pages:] 1-40 [DOI/URN:] doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-35
Series/Report no.:Economics 2009-35
Abstract:The author proposes a two-round process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first round, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first round is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second round, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second round, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. The author provides a first pass of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program.
Subjects:Democratic constitutions
minority voting
public projects
JEL:D60
D72
H40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:doi:10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2009-35
URL of the first edition:http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2009-35
Creative Commons License:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Journal Articles

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
609707043.PDF318.69 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28105

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.