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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28103
  

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dc.contributor.authorCorneo, Giacomoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:29:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:29:11Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28103-
dc.description.abstractSince objective news coverage is vital to democracy, captured media can seriously distort collective decisions. The current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare eþects induced by alternative policy options and derive information about those eþects from the mass media. The media might however secretly collude with interest groups in order to in.uence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad, it is shown that an increase in the concentration of firm ownership makes the occurrence of media bias more likely. Although media bias is not always welfare worsening, conditions for it to raise welfare are restrictive.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2005/1en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMass Mediaen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Badsen_US
dc.subject.keywordVotingen_US
dc.subject.keywordWealth Inequalityen_US
dc.titleMedia capture in a democracy: the role of wealth concentrationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn609073281en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20051-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin

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