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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28048
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| Title: | | Delegation and incentives  |
| Authors: | | Bester, Helmut Krähmer, Daniel |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2007/1 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a project selection stage in which the principal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the authority. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We nd that the consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited liability, delegation is never optimal. |
| Subjects: | | Authority delegation incentives moral hazard principal / agent problem limited liability |
| JEL: | | D82 D8 |
| ISBN: | | 3938369493 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin
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