Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/28035 
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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen
dc.contributor.authorKopits, Georgeen
dc.contributor.authorSzékely, István P.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-20-
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:14Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.isbn3938369345en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28035-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes - allowing for regime shifts - depending on country characteristics and EU policies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2006/9en
dc.subject.jelH6en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordFiscal policyen
dc.subject.keywordEU economic and monetary unionen
dc.subject.keywordgame-theoretic approachen
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken
dc.subject.stwEU-Erweiterungen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwOstmitteleuropaen
dc.subject.stwNordosteuropaen
dc.titleFiscal indulgence in Central Europe: loss of the external anchor?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn517662272en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20069en

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