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dc.contributor.authorBerger, Helgeen_US
dc.contributor.authorKopits, Georgeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSzékely, István P.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-09-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:14Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:14Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3938369345en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28035-
dc.description.abstractIn recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes—allowing for regime shifts—depending on country characteristics and EU policies.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2006/9en_US
dc.subject.jelH6en_US
dc.subject.jelC70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFiscal policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordEU economic and monetary unionen_US
dc.subject.keywordgame-theoretic approachen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Erweiterungen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwOstmitteleuropaen_US
dc.subject.stwNordosteuropaen_US
dc.titleFiscal indulgence in Central Europe: loss of the external anchor?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn517662272en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:20069-
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