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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28023
  

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dc.contributor.authorPuschke, Kerstinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-02-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-25T13:28:04Z-
dc.date.available2009-09-25T13:28:04Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.isbn3938369248en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/28023-
dc.description.abstractAuthority is modelled as the right to undertake a non-contractible decision in a joint project. We show that the allocation of authority depends on bargaining power and differences in both parties cost functions. The decision-maker is assumed to exert an externality on the other parties. Overall surplus is shared according to generalized Nash bargaining. Under limited liability, the agent with the larger cost parameter receives authority if the agents’ cost parameters are very different. If the agents have similar cost parameters, bargaining power determines the allocation of authority. Possible applications include the introduction of a new product.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFreie Univ., Fachbereich Wirtschaftswiss. Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin 2005/25en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelL24en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuthorityen_US
dc.subject.keywordDecision Rightsen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen_US
dc.subject.stwAutoritäten_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwBeschränkte Haftungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe allocation of authority under limited liabilityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn507402189en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:200525-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge, FB Wirtschaftswissenschaft, FU Berlin

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